Janet "Jancy" Hoeffel
Catherine D. Pierson Professor of Law
- New Orleans LA UNITED STATES
- Tulane Law School
Janet (Jancy) Hoeffel specializes in criminal law and procedure, death penalty law and evidence
Media
Biography
Her scholarly work has focused on the constitutional regulations of discretionary actors in the criminal justice system. Recent publications include “Miranda’s First Principles,” 50 Texas Tech Law Review 113 (2017) and “Death Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 68 Arkansas Law Review 267 (2017). She also recently co-authored two casebooks and a hornbook on criminal investigative and adjudicative procedure.
Hoeffel joined the Tulane Law School faculty in 1999 and served as vice dean from 2009-2012. She received the Felix Frankfurter Award for Distinguished Teaching, the law school’s most prestigious teaching honor, from the Class of 2005. She was one of eight law professors invited to participate in an Innovation Summit on improving assessment tools for law students in 2013. In 2017, she received Tulane University’s highest teaching honor, the President’s Award for Excellence in Professional and Graduate Teaching.
Hoeffel also has served on the Louisiana Public Defender Board, where she rewrote the statewide practice standards for criminal defense attorneys, and the boards of the Innocence Project, the Capital Appeals Project and the Promise of Justice Initiative. She has served as an expert witness on the death penalty and on effective assistance of counsel, testified before the Louisiana legislature and frequently given expert commentary for news media.
Accomplishments
Steven M. Block Civil Liberties Award, Stanford Law School
1990
Irving Hellman, Jr. Special Award, Stanford Law School
1990
Frank Baker Belcher Evidence Award, Stanford Law School
1990
David F. Bowers Prize in American Studies, Princeton University
1985
Education
Stanford University
J.D.
Law
1990
Princeton University
B.A.
History
1985
Media Appearances
Football hero’s slaying plays out in court of public opinion
Enterprise-Record
2016-04-14
His popularity is one of the hurdles for the defense, says Janet “Jancy” Hoeffel, a criminal lawyer and professor at Tulane’s law school.
“You’re looking at getting a jury, anywhere in the state of Louisiana, for a Saint,” she said. “I think there are no greater heroes in this town than the team, the Saints. People are huge fans here in ways that I don’t see in other cities.”
Was the Metairie Lion King caper robbery or theft? Legal expert weighs in
NOLA
2014-12-11
"The main difference between a robbery and a theft is typically that a robbery involves the presence of the victim during the taking of the item, making it a more frightening, and potentially dangerous, event," Hoeffel said.
Articles
Criminal (Dis)Appearance
George Washington Law ReviewPamela Metzger, Janet C. Hoeffel
2019
Across the United States, thousands of newly-arrested people disappear. They languish behind bars for days, weeks – or even months – without ever seeing a judge or an attorney. Yet, the Supreme Court requires more constitutional process for the seizure “of a refrigerator, . . . temporary suspension of a public school student, or . . . suspension of a driver’s license,” than it does for a person who has just been arrested and detained. A new arrestee has no clearly-established constitutional right to a prompt initial appearance procedure. As a result, there is no constitutional doctrine that guarantees her the right to appear promptly before a judge, to challenge the evidence that supports her arrest, to receive the prompt assistance of counsel, or to participate in an adversarial bail hearing.
Amidst our national conversation about the need for criminal justice reform, this Article is the first scholarly work to address the initial appearance crisis. Part I of the Article describes the epidemic of detention-without-process that plagues our criminal justice system. Part II explores the legal landscape that produced this crisis. It describes the Supreme Court’s commitment to a narrow Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and critiques the Court’s rejection of early-stage criminal due process rights. Part III marshals substantive and procedural due process doctrines that can vindicate the constitutional right to a prompt and thorough initial appearance procedure. Part IV proposes an agenda for research and reform of early-stage criminal proceedings.
Criminal Charging
ArticlePamela Metzger, Janet C. Hoeffel
2016
This is one in a series of four articles addressing due process rights in early post-arrest criminal procedure.
Across the United States, hundreds of thousands of uncharged defendants sit behind bars without formal charges having been filed against them. This wholesale detention of uncharged criminal suspects is a “recurring part of the state sanctioned prosecutorial system.” This pre-charge detention is based solely the unchallenged allegations of a law enforcement officer. Only when a prosecutor “screens” the case formalizing or dismissing the charges, can the accused begin to defend himself or return to his pre-incarceration life.
How are these lengthy uncharged detentions possible? The answer lies in the Supreme Court’s wholesale failure to regulate pre-charge criminal process. The United States Supreme Court provides more procedural protection against the wrongful “custody of a refrigerator, . . . temporary suspension of a public school student, or . . . suspension of a driver’s license,” than it does against the incarceration of an uncharged, presumptively innocent person. Uncharged pretrial defendants have no constitutional right to a prompt decision about whether the prosecution will charge them; no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at bail proceedings; no constitutional right to investigation, discovery, or Brady material; and no constitutional right to an adversarial judicial review of the evidence used to restrain their liberty.
Uncharged detainees have little, if any, due process, recourse against their Kafkaesque plight. In other contexts, the United States Supreme Court relies on the Due Process Clause to forbid, or to closely regulate, the state’s ability to incarcerate innocent people. Yet, the Supreme Court has adopted a restrictive approach to criminal due process; that approach deprives uncharged defendants of any meaningful protection against their long detention.
Because the Supreme Court has applied radically different Due Process standards to criminal and civil proceedings, uncharged – and often unrepresented detainees – must rely upon the ineffectual Speedy Trial Clause, the under-enforced Eighth Amendment, and the dubious good graces of state prosecutors, to prevent their prolonged incarceration without prosecution. This reliance has proved a dismal failure.
Elections, Power, and Local Control: Reining in Chief Prosecutors and Sheriffs
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Research PaperStephen Singer, Janet C. Hoeffel
2016
This paper argues that the election of chief prosecutors and sheriffs, and these officials’ narrow focus on crime control and suppression, has contributed to the problem of mass incarceration. The authors propose that the appointment of these positions by officials with broader responsibilities, like mayors, city council members, governors, and state legislators, would help remove barriers that currently prevent needed reforms in the criminal justice system.